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Introduction
In June 1984 the United States International Trade
Commission (ITC) passed judgement on a petition by
11 large US copper producers which argued that
imports of the metal, notably from Chile, were
unfairly damaging the domestic mining industry, and
asked for restrictive measures to be applied.' The
Commission accepted the argument and recommended
to President Reagan the introduction of either import
quotas or of additional tariffs on copper for a period
of five years.2 The petition had originally been called
'an attack on the free market' by Chilean spokesmen,
and the ITC recommendation in turn was followed by
threats of retaliation from the Chilean government in
the form of a possible suspension of payments on the
country's external debt.3
In the event President Reagan did not accept the ITC
recommendation. But the fact that the incident took
place, and that the possibility arose of a major split
between governments that are staunch political allies
and are committed to the same economic philosophy
is an indication of the extent to which the Chilean
government's copper policy is perceived as creating
grave problems for the world industry, and as being, in
some sense, less than rational. The issues, however, are
considerably more complex, and any attempt at
evaluation requires a discussion of the background of
the policy and of its more specific components and
'Seethe report on the press conference given by the eleven companies
on the 26th January 1984 in US imports aimed at Chile', Meto!
Bulletin, No.6858,31st January 1984, p9. See also the statement by
Richard de J. Osborne, President of ASARCO, to a Subcommittee
of the US Senate (US Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Use of IMF
Resources by Major Copper-Producing Countries, Hearing on
S.2524, a Bill Entitled 'The Copper and Extractive Industries Fair
Competition Act of 1984', 2 August, 1984, Washington D.C., US
Government Printing Office, 1984, pp4O-45).
2 'ITC split on copper relief', Metal Bulletin. No. 6899, 29th June
1984, p9.
''Chile reacts to US demands', Latin America Commodities Report,
CR-84-04, 24th February 1984, p2; 'Second warning on debt
payment', ibid., CR-84-l3, 6th July 1984, p2.
¡DB Bulletin, t986. vol 17 no 4, tsstitute of Development Studies, Sussex
rationale. The aim of this article is briefly to provide
some elements towards such an evaluation.
Chile and World Copper Demand and Supply
A central aim of the copper policy of the Chilean
military government is the expansion of output and of
exports. This has become particularly marked since
1981, when over a period of four years Chilean copper
production grew by nearly 30 per cent with respect to
the average of the preceding six years. As this period
coincided with one of slack demand and low prices,
this gave rise to the accusation - echoed by the
spokesman of the 11 US companies that petitioned the
ITC - that the Chilean government was subsidising
the country's copper industry while at the same time
receiving subsidies from the International Monetary
Fund on account of the low prices of its primary
exports.4
Undoubtedly the expansion of Chilean copper output
had a significant impact on the balance of supply and
demand in the world market. Table 1 shows the annual
mine output of copper of the main market economy
producer countries for the period 1976-85, as well as
the overall refined copper balance and the annual
average international price.
Between 1976 and 1981 refined copper consumption in
the market economies exceeded refined copper
production by a small margin (refined output in turn
exceeds mine output because of the recovery of scrap).
In 1982 there was a seven per cent fall in refined
consumption as compared with the average for 1979-
81, while refined output expanded. A slight recovery
of consumption in 1983 was more than offset by a
further growth of output. A more substantial recovery
of consumption in 1984 was followed by a fall in 1985,
when again refined output exceeded consumption.
The price plunged in 1982 and reached a historic low in
1984.
4US Senate, op.cit. note I above.
57
Table 1
Market economies*: Annual copper production (mine), refined consumption and output, and prices, 1976-85
(thousand metric tonnes and US$ per lb)
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The increase in the Chilean output between 1976-81
and 1985 was almost exactly matched by a fall in US
production, as a number of major mines closed down
because of the low prices.5 Canadian output remained
more or less stable during the period and the fall in
Zambian production was again offset by increases in
the output of Zaire and Peru. Total supply increased
by about 4.5 per cent, with Mexico showing the most
substantial growth among the other producers.
The Chilean expansion therefore must be put in the
context of the operation of a more general
phenomenon among Third World producers. This is
akin to the 'backward-bending supply curve' well
known to agricultural economists, whereby a fall in
demand and prices produces an increase in output as
producers attempt to maintain their total export
Shearson Lehman/American Express, Annual Review of the World
Copper Industry 1984-85, London, October 1984, pp22-25.
* includes Yugoslavia
Sources: production and consumption, World Metal Statistics Yearbook 1986 (London: World Bureau of Metal Statistics, 1986);
prices are London Metal Exchange wirebar settlement averages until 1981 and higher grade averages thereafter, as reported in
Metal Statistics 1974-84 (Frankfurt am Main: Metallgesellschaft AG, 1985), converted into US per lb on the basis of exchange
rates reported in ibid. Price for 1985 taken from Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile, Memoria Anual 1985 (Santiago, 1986).
Prices in 1983 currency deflated by the FOB Manufacturing Unit Value Index of the World Bank, in World Bank, Commodity
Trade and Price Trends 1984-85 (Washington DC., 1985), p38, except for 1984-85 deflated by the unit value index for
manufactured exports from developed market economies reported in United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March 1986,
pxx.
revenue. Zambia is no exception: its drop in
production has not been a result of deliberate policies
but of difficulties mainly related to the scarcity of
foreign exchange for raw materials and spares.6
The Background to Chilean Copper Policy:
Comparative Costs
The Chilean government was, however, in a
particularly favourable position to adopt and
implement a policy of expansion of output because of
two factors: on the one hand its low cost of production
and on the other the fact that 80 per cent of the total
output is produced by the state company, CODELCO-
Chile.
5C. Fortin, 'Mining', in Restructuring in 1/te Midst of Crisis. Report of
the QEH/CFTC Mission on Public Sector Investment in Zambia,
January 1984.
1976-8
(aver)
1979-81
(aver)
1982 1983 1984 1985
Mine production
Chile 1,032 1,071 1,242 1,258 1,291 1,356
USA 1,393 1,388 1,140 1,038 1,091 1,092
Canada 716 681 613 653 722 724
Zambia 668 590 530 591 576 520
Zaire 450 455 503 502 501 513
Peru 308 364 356 322 364 387
Other 1,612 1,791 1,851 1,919 1,844 1,858
Total market economies 6,179 6,340 6,235 6,283 6,389 6,450
Refined consumption 6,860 7,289 6,771 6,821 7,551 7,184
Refined production 6,800 7,134 7,155 7,323 7,207 7,232
Prices
current US/lb 61.7 89.6 67.2 72.2 62.6 64.3
1983 US4/lb 77.5 84.4 65.2 72.2 64.8 65.8
Cost comparisons are notoriously fraught in the
international copper industry. All the data available,
though, seem to suggest that Chile is among the lowest
cost producers. Table 2 presents estimates of average
total cost and of direct production costs for the main
producer countries in mid- 1984, offered by the Mining
Journal and by the US mining company Asarco
respectively.
Table 2
Main market economy copper producing countries:
costs of production, 1984
(US$/lb)
Source: Shearson Lehman/American Express, AnnualRevíew
of the World Copper Industry 1984-85, London, October
1984, p46
The Chilean cost advantage with respect to the USA
and Canada is partly due to higher ore grades7 and the
absence of environmental regulations; as compared to
Zaire and Zambia Chile has more favourable
geological conditions. The two most important
factors, however, are firstly some specific features of
the performance of the Chilean state copper sector and
secondly the government's exchange rate policy.
As already indicated, the state-owned part of the
Chilean copper industry accounts for about 80 per cent
of total output. This is a result of the fact that the
military regime that overthrew the government of
President Salvador Allende in 1973 did not return to
private hands the large scale copper mines nationalised
by the latter. This is surprising for a government
committed to privatisation, and is explained by the
military perception of copper as a strategic sector,
which overrode the views of the civilian economic
decision makers - the 'Chicago boys'. The latter,
however, insisted that the state copper company,
CODELCO-Chile, should operate as a profit-
Average ore grade in Chile at the end of the l970s was 1.11 per cent,
while in the US and Canada it was around 0.70 per cent.
W. Gluschke, J. Shaw and B. Varon, Copper: The Next F?fteen
Years. A United Nation7 Study, Dordrecht/Boston/London,
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979, pSI, Table 12.
maximising concern. Cost reduction became therefore
a central aim, and it was greatly helped by the high
degree of control over labour that the new regime
introduced: trade union activities were repressed,
strikes were outlawed and real wages were either kept
constant or reduced in 1975-77 while productivity
increased. In addition, a high cost smaller mine was
closed down in 1975 and administrative costs were
reduced through a restructuring of the company.
Finally, income from the sale of by-products, notably
molybdenum, increased five-fold between 1974 and
1980, and although it fell afterwards, it remained at
about twice the 1974 level.8
Undoubtedly, though, the most important factor
making for a fall in production costs was the massive
devaluation of the Chilean peso in 1974 and 1976. The
introduction in 1979 of a fixed exchange rate meant an
effective revaluation as inflation in Chile was higher
than international inflation, and CODELCO-Chile's
exchange advantage began to be eroded, but a new
series of devaluations beginning in 1982 restored it to a
large extent.
The preceding, together with the increase in output
that began in 1976, has meant that CODELCO-Chile
has been a highly profitable operation and has
contributed substantially to the fiscal budget. In
effect, far from being subsidised by the government,
the performance of the state copper sector was a main
element in the elimination of the deficit of the
consolidated public sector which occurred in Chile
between 1978 and 1979. Table 3 presents data on the
performance of the state copper sector for the period
1975-85.
An Aside on Investment Policies9
It should be noted that the level of investment
expenditure of the company is rather modest when
compared with its operating profits. This reflects the
fact that this is the one aspect on which the company
was not allowed to operate as a profit-maximising
private concern. CODELCO-Chile's budget is in fact
subject to the approval of the Ministries of Mining and
Finance. The approved budget assumes a given price
for copper and sets the authorised amounts of current
and capital expenditure and of taxes and dividends to
be paid to the government. If the actual price exceeds
the price forecast the extra revenue accrues
automatically to the Treasury. If, on the other hand,
the actual price is lower than predicted, CODELCO-
Chile still has to meet its assumed obligations to the
'See C. Fortin, 'Copper Investment Policy in Chile, 1973-84' Natural
Resources Forum, Vol. 8, No.4, October 1984, pp315-325.
'Ibid. and CED-Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Alternativas de
expansión de la Gran Minería del Cobre, Materiales para Discusión
No. 88, Santiago, May 1985.
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average total cost direct production cost
(Mining Journal) (Asarco)
Chile 49 50
Peru 69 58
Zambia 81 80
Zaire 83 70
Canada 84 74
USA 84.5 82
Table 3
National Copper Corporation of Chile: Some Indicators of Performance, 1975-85
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Souree: based on Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile, Memoria Anual, 1976-8 5
government, either through reserves or external
borrowing, for which authority from the Finance
Ministry is also required. In 1976 and 1977 investment
was probably below the level required to replace plant
and equipment, reflecting both low copper prices and
the views of the government's economic policy-
makers that the state should not expand in a sector
that could attract private foreign capital. In 1978 a
policy was adopted whereby the state company should
invest at a level sufficient to maintain output at around
900,000 tonnes per year; this required some expansion
of treatment and processing capacity, because of the
decline in ore grades. Investment levels thus went up in
1978-80. At the same time, however, the government
was committed to a policy of expanding copper output
and this it sought to achieve through attracting foreign
capital. A highly favourable investment regime was
offered, and between 1977 and 1982 six investment
agreements were entered into with international
mining companies, for a total of US$5.6 bn; the
maximum output of the new mines was 830,000 tonnes
of copper content. By 1982, however, only about
US$680 mn of new investment had materialised and
no significant new output had been added. Since then,
four of the projects have been abandoned or
postponed indefinitely. This reflects both the
depressed state of the international mineral markets
and the doubts of foreign investors about the stability
of the investment regime in the context of increasing
political conflict in Chile. These difficulties were
highlighted by the absence of response on the part of
foreign capital to the introduction of a new mining
code in 1983 which considerably increases the
advantages of foreign mining investors.
In the circumstances the government introduced a
change of policy in 1981. Investment in the state sector
increased substantially and output grew by about
15 per cent. By 1985 the output of the state company
was 20 per cent higher than in 1981, and the company
was announcing further expansion plans that would
take its output near the 1.5 mn tonnes mark at the end
of the decade)°
An Evaluation of Chilean Copper Policy
The rationale for the Chilean policy of output
expansion is twofold: on the one hand, the cost
advantage that the country has, already discussed; on
the other, an assessment of the future prospects for the
copper market which assumes declining prices. This is
based on existing trends towards a reduction in the
copper intensity of production in the industrialised
countries resulting from technical change - mini-
aturisation, substitution - and from changes in the
composition of aggregate demand, notably the
relative increase of the service sector. It is further
argued that an expansive policy is favourable to the
industry in the long run, inasmuch as it forces
increases in efficiency and productivity and drives out
the non-competitive producers, thereby restoring
°These p'ans were reported later to have been revised downwards
because of technical and financial reasons. See Latin America
CommoditiesReport, CR-85-lO, 24 May 1985, p8.
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198/ 1982 1983 1984 /985
Copper production
(000 metric tonnes) 682.4 854.1 892.7 876.5 910.2 904.5 893.6 1,032.9 1,012.1 1,049.8 1,076.7
Costs (US4/lb)
Gross operating 42.1 37.9 37.3 36.8 42.3 57.3 62.1 43.5 41.5 36.3 34.2
Administration and sales 13.0 4.0 3.5 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.2
Depart. and financial 1.8 7.7 7.3 7.8 6.9 6.6 8.9 8.2 12.8 9.5 11.3
Income from by-products 6.5 5.1 6.4 8.8 19.0 20.6 13.5 9.5 9.5 8.6 7.0
Total net cost 50.4 44.5 41.7 37.0 31.6 45.3 59.9 44.0 46.3 38.8 39.7
Operating profits
(US$ million) 127.3 494.5 390.4 402.1 1,073.2 970.1 338.5 495.3 630.6 440.9 482.4
Payments to government
(US$ million) 244.9 432.2 398.8 368.1 865.2 1,006.6 480.3 523.9 678.5 556.5 411.3
Gross investment
(US$ million) 115.9 111.0 99.6 161.0 177.6 266.7 307.2 233.7 200.5 276.2 369.5
more remunerative prices. By the same token, the
policy is argued to be consistent with international
welfare criteria generally.
What have been the results of implementing this
policy? In a first and important respect the policy has
undoubtedly had favourable effects for the country:
copper export receipts have shown considerably less
fluctuation than international prices and have been a
major contributor to the merchandise trade surplus
that the Chilean economy has exhibited since 1982.
The contribution of the copper sector to the fiscal
budget has also been mentioned. While it could be
argued that a policy of reducing supply could have
been even more profitable through an increase in
prices, econometric evidence seems to suggest that a
reduction in Chilean output alone would not have
increased prices to a sufficient extent to compensate
for the fall in quantity." The considerations militating
against a reduction in output among other Third
World producers have also been mentioned already.
Self-restraint on the part of Chile would have
probably led to a loss of markets to other producers.
This is not to suggest that the Chilean copper policy
and its relatively favourable impact in terms of foreign
exchange receipts had a developmental impact more
generally. As will be discussed below, in the context of
the overall economic policy of the Chilean military
government such developmental impact was very
limited.
The policy also contributed to producing one of the
forecast results in the international market: higher
cost producers tended to improve their productivity, a
phenomenon particularly noticeable among USA
mines.'2 In that sense it could be argued that Chile
contributed to increasing efficiency in the world
copper industry. On the other hand, the expectation
that Chile would replace less efficient producers in the
world market is more debatable. As already indicated,
the main reductions in output took place among US
producers, and this was combined with a policy of
intensive effort to improve on productivity levels; as a
result, US mines began to reopen in 1984-85 and it is
unlikely that Chile's inroads in the US market will
prove durable. On the other hand, high cost producers
among Third World countries have not reduced their
output, except marginally and unwillingly, as in the
case of Zambia; Zaire, Peru and Mexico have in fact
increased their production. This points both to a flaw
in the Chilean policy and to possible policy
alternatives that could retain the aim of maximising
copper export revenues in the short and medium term.
"See J. Bande, Más allá del CIPEC. Proposiciones para una estrategia
de Chile en el mercado del cobre, CED- Centro de Estudios del
Desarrollo, Materiales para Discusión No.84, Santiago, May 1985.
2 Los productores norteamericanos después de la ITC', Minería y
Desarrollo, vol. t, No. 6, Santiago, June 1985, pl.
Chile is a member of the Inter Governmental Council
of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), of which
Peru, Zaire and Zambia are also members. A policy of
maximising output over a period of years can be
regarded not only as compatible but as complementary
to a policy of coordination with other Third World
producers to agree on flexible production policies that
could include reductions and cuts under particular
conditions. Such a flexible, coordinated and inter-
ventionist approach has been urged on the Chilean
copper authorities by the Chilean critics of the current
policy who nevertheless agree that production
restraint is not perse a desirable course of action. Such
alternative proposals also include reference to the
need to maximise the presence of the state copper
sector in the efforts to expand productive capacity.
This is argued both on the grounds that state
investment in the expansion of existing operation is
less costly and more profitable, and on the grounds
that the benefits to the national economy are higher
- everything else being equal - when the investor is
the state company than when it is an international
enterprise. t3
Perhaps the most serious criticisms of the policies of
the Chilean military government in relation to the
copper sector have less to do with the sector itself than
with the use of the foreign exchange surplus generated
by copper exports and, in the last analysis, with the
overall economic policy of the regime. Table 4 shows
the evolution of the main indicators of economic
development in Chile in the period 1976-85. In 1985
per capita GDP was only 92 per cent of what it had
been in 1971, while per capita manufacturing value
added was 72 per cent of its 1971 value. Per capita
gross fixed capital formation was 78 per cent of the
average 1960-70. Per capita manufacturing value
added averaged 74.4 per cent of the 1971 value, and in
no year of the period was it above 86 per cent. Per
capita GDP averaged 91.4 per cent of the 1971 value,
and only in two years - 1980 and 1981 - was it above
the 1971 level. These are the last two years of what was
called the economic 'boom' in which per capita GDP
grew at about six per cent per year from 1977 until
1982. This figure, however, is doubly deceiving. On the
one hand, the 'boom' followed a drop of over 20 per
cent in per capita GDP in the first three and a half
years of the regime, and therefore the accumulated
growth between 1977 and 1981 was only nine per cent
as compared to the 1972 level. Furthermore, if the
growth figure is corrected for the payment of the
foreign debt - i.e. if per capita gross national product,
as distinct from GDP is used - and if the value added
by the marketing of imported goods and by financial
services is excluded, the figure for 1981 is in effect
below that for 1973.
'CED, op.cit. note 9 above, pp4S-55. For the general critique see
Bande, op.cit. note 11 above.
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Table 4
Chile: Main Economic Indicators, 1976-85
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The poor performance of the Chilean economy in this
period was a function of the overall economic policy
adopted by the military regime. This was an extreme
form of free-market model, in which the aim was the
elimination of state intervention in the economy,
whether in the sphere of prices and wages, of
protection, of the use of taxation to influence resource
allocation, of subsidies to industry, and of rates of
exchange and rates of interest. In all these areas the
objective was to allow the free forces of the market to
operate. In particular, this meant a more or less
complete opening of the economy both in trade and in
financial flows. This was basically accomplished by
1979, when the maximum tariff for imports was set at
ten per cent and most restrictions on the movement of
capital were removed. This is not the place to attempt
an overall evaluation of the economic policies of the
Chilean military government, a task which has
furthermore been carried out elsewhere.'4 It would
appear, however, that the result of the policies was a
fundamental shift in the economic dynamics of the
system away from the productive sphere towards the
financial sector, and the growth of luxurious
consumption to the detriment of accumulation. In
terms of the external sector, this meant an inordinate
growth of imports of consumer goods, particularly
durables, which exceeded the growth of exports and
was therefore financed with an increasing external
14 C. Fortin, The Political Economy of Repressive Monetarism: The
State and Capital Accumulation in Post-1973 Chile', inC. Anglade
and C. Fortin (eds.), The State and Capital Accumulation in Latin
America, London. Macmillan, 1985, pp I39-209.
Source: based on national accounts data as reported in Banco Central de Chile, Boletín Mensual, various issues
indebtedness.'5 Table 5 shows the behaviour of the
main components of the balance of payments for the
period 1976-85.
To conclude, it would appear that the central objective
of the copper policy of the Chilean military regime,
namely the expansion of output, is defensible both in
terms of its impact on the Chilean economy and of its
effects on the world copper industry and market, but
that the policy itself has been flawed inasmuch as it has
not been accompanied by a determined and creative
presence in the world markets, including coordination
with other Third World producers, flexibility in the
setting of output targets and a fuller use of the various
mechanisms that the market offers to producers and
consumers alike. In terms of its internal impact, it
would appear that, while the policy allowed for the
availability of a higher level of foreign exchange
resources than would otherwise have been the case, the
overall policy of the military regime conspired against
those resources being put to developmental use. As a
result Chile, which in 1982 replaced the United States
as the largest copper producer in the world, was at the
same time plunged into an economic crisis from which
it still has not recovered.
5 This was mostly private foreign commercial borrowing; arguably
the performance of the copper industry increased Chile's externat
borrowing capacity.
per capita GDP
(1971 =100)
per capita manufacturing
value added
per capita gross fixed capital
formation
(1971 = 100) (1960-70 = 100)
1976 78.1 66.8 62.1
1977 84.3 71.2 70.6
1978 89.7 76.5 81.4
1979 95.5 81.1 93.6
1980 101.2 84.7 112.1
1981 105.2 85.4 126.4
1982 90.2 67.1 78.2
1983 86.9 67.1 64.5
1984 90.8 72.4 69.2
1985 91.6 72.1 78.1
Table 5
Chile: Balance of Payments, 1976-85
(million US$)
Soujce: Banco Central de Chile, Boletín Mensual, No. 698, April 1986, p998 and No. 699, May 1986, p1258
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1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 ¡982 1983 1984 1985
Current account 148 -551 -1,088 -1,189 -1,971 -4,733 -2,304 -1,117 -2,060 -1,307
Trade balance
(goods) 643 34 -426 -355 -764 -2,677 63 986 293 788
Exports 2,116 2,185 2,460 3,835 4,705 3,836 3,706 3,831 3,650 3,743
Imports -1,473 -2,151 -2,886 -4,190 -5,469 -6,513 -3,643 -2,845 -3,357 -2,955
Services -523 -660 -732 -914 -1,320 -2,164 -2,476 -2,200 -2,452 -2,156
Capital account 66 577 1,946 2,247 3,165 4,698 1,215 508 1,978 1,224
Direct foreign
investment -1 16 177 233 170 362 384 132 67 112
Autonomous
capital 67 561 1,769 2,014 2,955 4,336 831 376 1,911 1,112
Surplus/deficit 281 118 712 1,047 1,244 67 -1,165 -541 17 -99
